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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 





Case No. 20050104-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals after pleading guilty to burglary of a dwelling, a second degree 
felony; possession of stolen property, a second degree felony; and attempted burglary, a third 
degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: May a defendant who pleads guilty raise an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim on appeal if he failed to pursue a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas? 
Issue 2: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in imposing sentence? 
Issue 3: Did the trial court err concerning defendant's motion to withdraw plea and 
motion for new counsel? 
Standard of Review: Issues one, two and three were raised pursuant to Anders v. 
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). As to Anders issues, this Court must make a "full 
examination of all the proceedings" and decide whether those issues are "wholly frivolous." 
Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168, 170 (Utah 1981).1 
Issue 4: Did the trial court err by proceeding with sentencing when defense counsel 
claimed that the prosecutor had made a promise to recommend concurrent sentences, but at 
sentencing the prosecutor disclaimed any promise and recommended consecutive sentences? 
Standard of Review: "A trial court's ruling regarding the enforceability of a plea 
agreement is a question of law." State v. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, f^ 10, 17 P.3d 1153. 
This Court reviews questions of law for correctness. Id. 
Issue 5: Did the trial court err by ordering that the Utah sentence ran consecutive to 
a pre-existing Alaska sentence, and then remanding defendant to the Utah Department of 
Corrections to serve the Utah sentence first? 
Standard of Review: "Sentencing decisions of the trial court are reviewed for abuse 
of discretion, including the decision to . . . impose consecutive sentences." State v. 
McDonald, 2005 UT App 86, f9, 110 P.3d 149. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutes are attached at Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (West 2004) - terms of imprisonment 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (West 2004) - concurrent or consecutive sentences 
1
 Two additional issues were not raised pursuant to Anders, therefore, appellant's 
counsel has not filed a motion to withdraw. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 30, 2004, defendant pled guilty to burglary of a dwelling, possession 
of stolen property, and attempted burglary (R39-48). The prosecutor asked for a pre-sentence 
investigation (PSI) (Rl 23:3). However, defendant told the court that he wanted to waive the 
minimum time period and go forward with sentencing the same day that he entered his plea 
(R123:15). 
The court imposed consecutive sentences (R123:23). Defendant then asked the court 
if a PSI would have made a difference (R123:24). The court said: "I don't know if a PSI 
would have made a difference at all." (R123:24). However, following further discussion, the 
court recalled the sentence and ordered that a pre-sentence report be prepared (Rl23:26). 
On December 3, 2004, defendant filed a letter with the court (R53-54). The letter 
asked the court to schedule a hearing so that defendant could ask to replace his counsel and 
move to withdraw his guilty pleas (R53-54). Then on December 10, 2004, defendant filed 
another letter that asked the court to disregard his request to withdraw his pleas (R58). At 
a hearing on December 14,2004, defendant, on the record, withdrew both the motion for new 
counsel and the motion to withdraw his guilty pleas (R124). 
Following preparation of a PSI report, defendant was sentenced on January 11,2005. 
His sentences on counts 1 and 3 (the burglary and attempted burglary that were alleged to 
have occurred on the same day) were run concurrently (Rl 25:13-15). However, the sentence 
for possession of stolen properly was ordered to be served consecutively to the other 
sentences (R125:15). In addition, the court said: "[w]ith regard to any other charges that may 
3 
be pending, I am not going to comment on that." (R125:15). However, the court ordered 
that the sentences imposed in this case "be served consecutively with the other sentence the 
defendant is currently serving. The only one I'm aware of is the one with (inaudible) 
similarities in Alaska." (Rl 25:15). The court then ordered defendant to be transported to the 
Utah State Prison to serve his sentence. Id. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts is taken from the factual basis for defendant's plea offered at 
defendant's plea hearing (Rl23:7-8). 
[0]n or about November 7th, 2004 here in Iron County, Mr. Deveraux 
entered a home here in Cedar City, your Honor, at that time and basically 
attempted to steal some property. 
Pursuant to that he was apprehended, your Honor. Within this same 
period of time there was [sic] about nine burglaries here in Cedar City. He 
confessed to those, your Honor, and was very forthright. I'll have to give that 
to Mr. Deveraux - - of nine different burglaries here in Cedar City. 
Also in further investigation Mr. Deveraux had a RV. In that RV, your 
Honor, there was thousands of dollars worth of stolen property from various 
locations. Mr. Deveraux also confessed of [sic] 17 burglaries in the St. George 
area, your Honor. 
He's been very cooperative, but the Court must know the width of this 
case. We charged him with - - one of the burglaries as per the plea negotiation 
and cooperation, the attempted burglary are all homes here in Cedar City that 
occurred approximately November 7th, and the possession of stolen property 
is some property that was stolen from the St. George area, and that amount was 
over $5,000. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant's appellate counsel has filed an Anders brief as to issues one, two and 
three, asserting that those challenges are frivolous. The State agrees that those claims have 
no basis in the law, and therefore defendant is not entitled to relief. 
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Defendant is also not entitled to relief based on his claims of sentencing errors. 
Defense counsel invited any error by making a sentencing recommendation for consecutive 
sentences. Therefore, defendant is not entitled to appellate relief. In addition, the trial court 
did not err by proceeding with sentencing when the prosecutor recommended consecutive 
sentences, because the prosecutor had never promised to recommend concurrent sentences. 
The trial court also did not err by ordering that the Utah sentences run consecutive to 
defendant's Alaska case, and then remanding defendant to the Utah Department of 
Corrections. 
ARGUMENT 
L THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO HEAR A CLAIM OF 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHEN 
DEFENDANT PLED GUILTY AND FAILED TO PROCEED 
WITH A MOTION TO WITHDRAW PLEA 
On appeal, defendant raises an issue as to whether a claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel was waived by entry of his guilty plea and failure to proceed with a motion to 
withdraw his plea (Aplt. Br. at 1). Defendant's appellate counsel has filed an Anders brief 
in connection with that claim, conceding that "Utah law unequivocally provides that 
ineffective assistance claims for defendants who plead guilty are waived if not raised until 
after sentence is imposed, where no motion to withdraw plea was made prior thereto." (Aplt. 
Br. at 8). Defendant also concedes that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear this claim 
(Aplt. Br. at 8). The State agrees that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear a claim of 
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ineffective assistance of counsel, when defendant failed to proceed with a motion to 
withdraw his pleas. 
Several days after entry of his guilty pleas, defendant filed a letter with the court 
asking the court to schedule a hearing so that he could ask to replace his counsel and move 
to withdraw his guilty pleas (R53-54). A week later, defendant filed another letter, asking 
the court to disregard his prior request to withdraw his pleas (R58). At a subsequent hearing, 
defendant, on the record, withdrew both the motion for new counsel and the motion to 
withdraw his guilty pleas (R124). 
In this case, although defendant did originally file a timely motion to withdraw his 
pleas, he then withdrew both his motion to withdraw plea and his motion for new counsel. 
Therefore no timely motion was before the district court because defendant withdrew the 
motions. Where no timely motion to withdraw a guilty plea is filed, this Court lacks 
jurisdiction to reach defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal. 
State v. Melo, 2001 UT App 392, ffi[ 6-8, 40 P.3d 646; State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, %39 40 
P.3d 630; State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34, % 48, 114 P.3d 585. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
SENTENCING DEFENDANT 
On appeal, defendant raises an issue as to whether the court abused its discretion in 
imposing sentence providing for one count to run consecutive to the other two counts, and 
the entire sentence to run consecutive to defendant's Alaska case (Aplt. Br. at 1). 
Defendant's appellate counsel has filed an Anders brief in connection with that claim, 
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conceding that defendant was sentenced within the legal parameters for the crimes for which 
he was convicted, and that the record does not reveal any reasonable argument for the 
position that the court abused its discretion (Aplt. Br. at 8). The State agrees with appellate 
counsel's conclusion. 
"The sentencing judge 'has broad discretion in imposing [a] sentence within the 
statutory scope provided by the legislature.'" State v. Sotolongo, 2003 UT App 214, % 3, 73 
P.3d991 (quoting State v. Rhodes, 818P.2d 1048,1051 (Utah App. 1991)). This Court "will 
not overturn a sentence unless it exceeds statutory or constitutional limits, the judge failed 
to consider 'all the legally relevant factors,' State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah 
App. 1997), or 'the actions of the judge were so inherently unfair as to constitute abuse of 
discretion.' Rhodes, 818 P.2d at 1051." Id. An '"appellate court can properly find abuse [of 
discretion] only if it can be said that no reasonable person would take the view adopted by 
the trial court. "'State v. Corbitt, 2003 UT App 411,^6, 82P.3d211 (citingStatev. Gerrard, 
584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978). 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant. Utah's Criminal 
Code provides that a person convicted of a second degree felony may be sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of imprisonment for "a term of not less than one year nor more than 15 
years." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(2) (West 2004). It also provides that a person convicted 
of a third degree felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term "not 
to exceed five years." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(3). Defendant's terms do not exceed 
those limits. 
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Defendant was convicted of three felony offenses. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1) 
(West 2004) gives the court discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences "if a 
defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one felony offense." The record here shows 
that, before making the decision to impose a consecutive term, the court properly considered 
"the gravity and circumstances of the offenses [and] the history, character, and rehabilitative 
needs of the defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2); (R125). 
Under the circumstances of this case, "it can[not] be said that no reasonable person 
would" impose the sentence imposed by the trial court. Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, ^ 6 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The State therefore agrees with defendant's 
appellate counsel that defendant's challenge to his sentences is without legal basis. 
III. DEFENDANT VOLUNTARILY WITHDREW HIS MOTIONS 
TO WITHDRAW PLEA AND FOR NEW COUNSEL; 
THEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DID NOT 
RULE ON THE MOTIONS 
On appeal, defendant raises an issue as to whether the trial court erred in denying his 
motion to withdraw plea and for new counsel (Aplt. Br. at 2). Defendant's appellate counsel 
has filed an Anders brief in connection with that claim, conceding that the motions were 
withdrawn by the defendant, and thus were not denied by the court (Aplt. Br. at 8). The State 
agrees with appellate counsel's conclusion. 
As addressed above, several days after entry of his guilty pleas, defendant filed a letter 
with the court asking the court to schedule a hearing so that he could ask to replace his 
counsel and move to withdraw his guilty pleas (R53-54). A week later, defendant filed 
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another letter that asked the court to disregard his request to withdraw his pleas (R58). At 
a subsequent hearing, defendant, on the record, withdrew both the motion for new counsel 
and the motion to withdraw his guilty pleas (R124). 
Defendant voluntarily withdrew his motion to withdraw plea and his motion for new 
counsel. Therefore, the motions were not denied by the court. The motions were simply 
never submitted for decision because they were voluntarily withdrawn by the defendant. 
There can be no valid argument that the court denied the motions because the motions were 
withdrawn (R124). 
IV. THE PROSECUTION DID NOT PROMISE TO RECOMMEND 
CONCURRENT SENTENCES; THEREFORE, THE TRIAL 
COURT DID NOT ERR IN PROCEEDING WITH SENTENCING 
WHEN THE PROSECUTORRECOMMENDED CONSECUTIVE 
SENTENCES 
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in proceeding with sentencing 
despite the prosecutor's reneging on a promise to recommend concurrent sentences. (Aplt. 
Br. at 11). Defendant is not entitled to relief on this claim because he invited any error and 
because the prosecutor never promised to recommend concurrent sentences. Therefore, the 
trial court did not err in proceeding with sentencing when the prosecutor recommended 
consecutive sentences. 
A. Defendant invited any error. 
Defense counsel invited any error by making a sentencing recommendation for 
consecutive sentences. After the prosecutor recommended consecutive sentences, defense 
counsel said: "where we do have three offenses here, there's probably another option the 
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Court could consider, and that is to - - you could make some of them consecutive and some 
concurrent." (R125:12). And that is exactly what the court did. 
The court ordered that counts I and III (the burglary and the attempted burglary that 
were alleged to have occurred on the same day in Iron county) be served concurrently 
(R125:13, 15). However, count II, for possession of stolen properly (which included 
property other than what he was alleged to have taken in the burglaries in Iron county), was 
ordered to be served consecutive to counts I and III (R125:13,15). The court said: "So Mr. 
Jackson [defense counsel] I believe that you're accurate. I think that this is an appropriate 
case where there be some consecutive and some concurrent, and that's what I've done 
(R125:15). 
Under these factual circumstances, defendant's claim should be precluded by the 
invited error doctrine. See State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, *f 9, 86 P.3d 742. The invited 
error rule "prevents a party from' "takfing] advantage of an error committed at trial when that 
party led the trial court into committing the error.'"" State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ^ 54, 
70 P.3d 111 (quoting State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996) (quoting State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993)). 
The trial court did not err by proceeding with sentencing after the prosecutor 
recommended consecutive sentences, because defense counsel invited any error by 
recommending to the court that it "could make some of them consecutive and some 
concurrent." (R125:12). 
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B. The record fails to establish that the prosecutor 
promised to recommend concurrent sentences. 
Defendant pled guilty. His written statement in support of his guilty plea says that 
"[a]ll promises, duties, and provisions of the plea agreement, if any, are fully contained in 
this statement" (R43). The statement does not contain any agreement that the prosecutor 
would recommend concurrent sentences. The statement says: "I understand that the State of 
Utah will be requesting the preparation of a presentence investigation report to aid in my 
sentencing. No other promises have been made to induce me to plead guilty." (R42-43). 
In his certification of voluntariness, the defendant states: "I am entering this plea of 
my own free will and choice. No force, threats, o[r] unlawful influence of any kind have 
been made to get me to plead guilty. No promises except those contained in this statement 
have been made to me (R42). 
At the plea hearing, the court asked defendant if he had read the statement of 
defendant in support of guilty plea. The defendant said that he had. The court then asked 
if defendant had read every word, and defendant acknowledged "Every word." (R123:12). 
The court then asked if defendant understood it, and defendant answered "Yes" and told the 
court that he had no questions about it (R123:12-13). 
At the plea hearing, the court specifically asked defendant: "Have any promises been 
made other than what we've placed on the record here today?" Defendant answered "No, 
sir." (R123:12). At the plea hearing, the prosecutor did not promise to recommend 
concurrent sentences (R123). In fact, the prosecutor told the court "we are asking for a pre-
11 
sentence investigation" (R123:3). Since the prosecutor was asking for a presentence 
investigation, he likely had not and would not have made any sentencing recommendation 
until reviewing the presentence report. 
When defendant told the court he wanted to waive the minimum time period and go 
forward with sentencing that day, the prosecutor again told the court that the State's 
"recommendation, obviously, would [be] to do apre-sentence investigation." (R123:15-16). 
The court asked defendant if he understood that the court could sentence him to 
consecutive prison terms. Defendant answered "Yes, your Honor." (R123:17). The court 
then asked the prosecutor if he had a recommendation for sentencing, or any information to 
show the court. Id. 
The prosecutor shared the following information with the court: 
I'm just going to show you the information I know, your Honor. 
Looking at Mr. Deveraux's record, your Honor, he does have quite an 
extensive record, mostly out of Alaska. 
I do have a description of charges. I don't have dispositions, but there's 
lots of charges. So I don't know in terms of disposition. I think he has been 
in prison before, your Honor. 
They do have - - you know, I have a spreadsheet that's six, seven pages 
long. I know that they are looking for him, and I believe he has absconded 
from Alaska. So they want to extradite him. They are interested (inaudible) 
bringing him forward, so I'm not sure of the status. I'm not sure if he escaped 
from the facility there o[r] if he has pending charges. I don't know the status 
of that. 
* * * 
Other information is I know that he's kind of signed immunity, I 
believe, with Washington County, he admitted to 17 burglaries there. They're 
only going to charge him with one, and that's still pending. I don't think he's 
entered a plea there yet. 
(R123:17-19). 
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The prosecutor then recommended prison, but did not make any recommendation as 
to concurrent or consecutive sentences. He said: "I suspect that if we did a PSI it would 
come back the recommendation as prison, and that would be our recommendation as well." 
(R123:19). Defense counsel said: "He knows he's going to prison. I mean the pre-sentence 
report - -1 mean he knows that that's what the recommendation is going to be." (R123:20). 
The court then imposed sentence and ordered that the sentences be served consecutively 
(R123:23). 
Following sentencing, defendant asked if the PSI would have made a difference 
(R123:24). The court said: "Well, now that I've sentenced you to the maximum, you want 
to back off and have another shot at it?" Id. The following exchange then occurred: 
MR. DEVERAUX: Well, I was told - -1 mean right from the start here that 
I'd be looking at maybe a year in prison here for this, and that it would all be 
run concurrent. That's why I've been cooperating. I was even told from St. 
George that they - - this would all be run concurrent together if I cooperated. 
THE COURT: No one talked to me. 
MR. DEVERAUX: And then talking with my attorney today, he's been telling 
that this won't - - it won't be a problem with going to this - - you know, me - -
if I take this deal he said, "Don't worry about what this says." 
MR. JACKSON: [defense counsel] Now, Mr. Deveraux, if you're going to tell 
what I gave as terms of advice, you've got to point out the fact that I advised 
you that this Judge has the decision. 
MR. DEVERAUX: Correct. 
MR JACKSON: It was not my advice that you waive the pre-sentence 
investigation report. You wanted to do that. You wanted to take that risk and 
get it all done today. I told you what the consequence of that could possibly 
be, and certainly the Judge has made a point of that. 
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MR DEVERAUX: The jur - - okay. All I know is that you told me that Mr. 
Little [the prosecutor] was agreeing that it shouldn't be no problem - - now tell 
me if I'm wrong here, that it shouldn't be - - that he was going to recommend 
and that you was going to talk to the Judge - -
MR. JACKSON: I just did. 
MR. DEVERAUX: And that you told me - -
MR. JACKSON: I told you that the Judge - - we have no way of binding the 
Judge. It's the Judge's decision. 
(R123:24-25). 
After further discussion with the prosecutor and defense counsel, the court agreed to 
recall the sentence and order a presentence report (R123:26). However, he also warned 
defendant that he didn't know that it was going to make any difference. Id. 
Nowhere in the entire record is there any promise or agreement by the prosecutor to 
recommend concurrent sentences. The prosecutor did not make any recommendation at all 
as to whether the sentences should be consecutive or concurrent, either in the written plea 
statement or at the plea hearing or at the initial sentencing. Nothing in the record establishes 
or even suggests that the prosecutor ever promised or agreed to recommend concurrent 
sentences. 
When defendant later appeared for sentencing following preparation of the PSI report, 
defense counsel said: 
Counsel and I did talk somewhat about this, your Honor. The 
circumstances are these. When Mr. Deveraux first entered into this plea 
agreement, there were some things said and some things understood. 
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I think one of the things that was talked about was that the county 
attorney's office at the time that they made this offer to him to plead to these 
three charges was going to recommend that there be - - that at least the three 
charges - - these three charges, they would recommend that they run 
concurrent. 
They weren't really sure what they would do with regard to the 
Washington County charges because they weren't filed then. So there was 
also a suggestion that they might make that recommendation provided what 
turned out on the police report - - or excuse me, on the pre-sentence report. 
But it was clearly contemplated that there would be a pre-sentence 
investigation. 
Mr. Deveraux basically wanted to go ahead and have sentencing done 
at that point. That was not something that was agreed to. So when he had me 
request that this Court go forward with sentencing on the day that he entered 
into the plea, I think Mr. Little [the prosecutor] felt that it was, know you [sic] 
basically that wasn't part of this agreement, so he was standing behind that the 
matter be served consecutive for the same reasons that I believe the Court did, 
which we don't know anything about Mr. Deveraux, we're not going to go 
there until we see more about him. 
(R125:5-6). 
However, the prosecutor disagreed with defense counsel's statement concerning any 
prior agreement: 
MR. GARRET [the prosecutor]: As you know, Mr. Little is the one that 
handled this case at the entry of plea. I am not aware of any promises that 
were made throughout the course of this case where the State agreed to run 
these charges concurrent. 
THE COURT: That was placed on the record. 
MR GARRET: And that was my point. In looking at the plea agreement, it 
promises that there would be an amended Information filed, and that we would 
ask for a pre-sentence investigation report, and then the State put no other 
promises have been made to induce him to plead guilty. 
So I'm taking the position that that promise was not made, and I would 




In his brief, defendant argues that when the prosecutor disavowed any promise, "the 
Court responded by indicating that the promise had been put on the record." (Aplt. br. 11). 
This is not correct. Not only is there no promise anywhere in the record, but defendant's 
version of the court's comment misinterprets what the court said. 
When the prosecutor disavowed any promise, the court said "That was placed on the 
record." (R125:8). No promise to recommend concurrent sentences appears anywhere in the 
record. What was placed on the record, at the plea hearing, was that "[n]o other promises" 
had been made to induce defendant to plead guilty (R42-43). Therefore, the court's 
statement "That was placed on the record" can only mean that the fact that the prosecutor 
made no promise was placed on the record. In the alternative, in a worst case scenario, it 
could mean even if there were such a promise, no promise was ever placed on the record. 
However, it cannot mean that a promise to recommend concurrent sentences was placed on 
the record, because no such promise exists anywhere in the record. Defendant is not entitled 
to appellate relief because he has failed to establish that the prosecutor promised to 
recommend concurrent sentences. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY ORDERING THE 
UTAH SENTENCE TO RUN CONSECUTIVE TO A PRE-
EXISTING ALASKA SENTENCE, AND THEN REMANDING 
DEFENDANT TO THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONS 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in ordering the Utah prison terms to be 
served consecutively to the Alaska case, and then remanding defendant to the Utah 
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Department of Corrections (Aplt. Br. 13-14).2 Defendant argues that he "cannot serve his 
Utah sentence consecutive to a sentence in Alaska unless he is first sent to Alaska to serve 
his sentence there." (Aplt. Br. 13). Defendant argues that to say that the Utah terms were 
to run consecutively to the Alaska term, "by definition means that the Utah term [had] to be 
served after the Alaska term." (Aplt. Br. 14). Defendant cites no authority in support of his 
novel definition of the term "consecutive." 
Black's law dictionary defines consecutive sentences as "[t]wo or more sentences of 
jail time to be served in sequence." Black's Law Dictionary, 1367 (7th ed. 1999). 
Consecutive sentences may also be called "cumulative sentences" or "accumulative 
sentences." Id. Therefore, consecutive sentences are merely sentences to be served in 
sequence, following each other. 
The Court's order that the Utah sentences were to be consecutive to the Alaska case 
simply means that the time served is to be cumulative, not concurrent. It does not mean that 
the Alaska sentence had to be served first. It merely means that the Alaska and Utah 
sentences are to be served in sequence, one after the other - regardless of which is served 
first. 
The trial court did not err by imposing consecutive sentences and then remanding 
defendant to the Utah Department of Corrections. 
2
 Defendant failed to raise this claim in the trial court. Therefore, this claim can 
only be reviewed for plain error. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant has failed to establish that the trial court erred at sentencing. In addition, 
arguments one, two and three advanced by defendant are frivolous and defense counsel 
complied with the mandates of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), State v. Clayton, 
639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981), Dunn v. Cook, 791 P.2d 873 (Utah 1990), and State v. Wells, 
2000 UT App 304, 13 P.3d 1056 (per curiam). Therefore, this Court should affirm 
defendant's conviction and sentence. 
ORAL ARGUMENT IS NOT REQUESTED 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED }(#_ December 2005. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
/yZ<^r^ 
ERIN RILEY 
Assistant Attorney General 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 76-3-203 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
*I Chapter 3. Punishments 
*! Part 2. Sentencing 
-•§ 76-3-203. Felony conviction—Indeterminate term of imprisonment 
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for 
an indeterminate term as follows: 
(1) In the case of a felony of the first degree, unless the statute provides 
otherwise, for a term of not less than five years and which may be for life. 
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree, unless the statute provides 
otherwise, for a term of not less than one year nor more than 15 years. 
(3) In the case of a felony of the third degree, unless the statute provides 
otherwise, for a term not to exceed five years. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-3-203; Laws 1976, c. 9, § 1; Laws 1977, c. 88, § 1; 
Laws 1983, c. 88, § 5; Laws 1995, c. 244, § 2, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1997, c. 
289, § 2, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 2000, c. 214, § 1, eff. March 14, 2000; Laws 
2003, c. 148, § 2, eff. May 5, 2003. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Laws 2003, c. 148, substantially rewrote this section that formerly provided: 
"(1) As used in this section, 'dangerous weapon1 has the same definition as in 
Section 76-1-601. 
"(2) A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to imprisonment 
for an indeterminate term as follows: 
" (a) In the case of a felony of the first degree, for a term of not less than five 
years, unless otherwise specifically provided by law, and which may be for life, 
but if the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that a dangerous weapon 
was used in the commission or furtherance of the felony, the court shall sentence 
the person convicted for a term of not less than six years, and which may be for 
life. 
" (b) In the case of a felony of the second degree, for a term of not less than one 
year nor more than 15 years, but if the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable 
doubt that a dangerous weapon was used in the commission or furtherance of the 
felony, the court shall sentence the person convicted for a term of not less than 
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two years nor more than 15 years; and the court may sentence the person convicted 
for a term of not less than two years nor more than 20 years. 
"(c) In the case of a felony of the third degree, for a term not to exceed five 
years, but if the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that a dangerous 
weapon was used in the commission or furtherance of the felony, the court shall 
sentence the person convicted for a term of not less than one year nor more than 
five years; and the court may sentence the person convicted for a term of not 
less than one year nor more than ten years. 
" (d) If the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that any person who has 
been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a felony in which a dangerous weapon 
was used in the commission of or furtherance of the felony and is subsequently 
convicted of another felony when a dangerous weapon was used in the commission of 
or furtherance of the felony shall, in addition to any other sentence imposed, be 
sentenced for an indeterminate term to be not less than five nor more than ten 
years to run consecutively and not concurrently." 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-3-203, UT ST § 76-3-203 
Current through end of 2005 First Special Session 
© 2005 Thomson/West 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 76-3-401 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
*I Chapter 3. Punishments 
*i Part 4. Limitations and Special Provisions on Sentences 
-+§ 76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences—Limitations—Definition 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than 
one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the 
offenses. The court shall state on the record and shall indicate m the order of 
judgment and commitment: 
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to each 
other; and 
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively 
with any other sentences the defendant is already serving. 
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or 
consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the 
offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative 
needs of the defendant. 
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if 
the later offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, 
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing would 
be inappropriate. 
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences 
are to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall 
request clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, the court 
shall enter a clarified order of commitment stating whether the sentences are to 
run consecutively or concurrently. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a single 
criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all 
sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as provided under 
Subsection (6)(b). 
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if: 
(I) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death 
penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or 
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(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct which 
occurs after his initial sentence or sentences are imposed. 
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which were 
committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present 
sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, and the 
conduct giving rise to the present offense did not occur after his initial 
sentencing by any other court. 
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6) (a) applies, determining the effect of 
consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board of 
Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been committed for a 
single term that consists of the aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as 
follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the maximum 
sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if any, 
constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms. 
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with 
the other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that provides the 
longer remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served. 
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of 
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of 
any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually served 
under the commitments. 
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to impose 
consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed to a 
secure correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not 
been terminated or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of where 
the person is located. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-3-401; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 7; Laws 1989, c. 181, § 1; 
Laws 1994, c. 13, § 21; Laws 1995, c. 139, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1997, c. 
283, § 1, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 1999, c. 275, § 1, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2002, 
c. 129, § 1, eff. July 1, 2002. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
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Laws 2002, c. 129, substantially rewrote this section that formerly provided: 
"(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than 
one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the 
offenses. Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently unless the court 
states in the sentence that they shall run consecutively. 
"(2) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if 
the later offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole 
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing would 
be inappropriate. 
"(3) If an order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences shall 
run consecutively or concurrently, and the Board of Pardons and Parole has reason 
to believe that the later offense occurred while the person was imprisoned or on 
parole for the earlier offense, the board shall request clarification from the 
court. Upon receipt of the request, the court shall enter an amended order of 
commitment stating whether the sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently. 
"(4) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the 
history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining 
whether to impose consecutive sentences. 
" (5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a single 
criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
"(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all 
sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as provided under 
Subsection (6)(b). 
"(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if: 
"(I) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death penalty 
or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or 
" (n) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct which 
occurs after his initial sentence or sentences are imposed. 
"(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant: 
"(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
"(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which were 
committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or 
" (c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present 
sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, and the 
conduct giving rise to the present offense did not occur after his initial 
sentencing by any other court. 
"(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6) (a) applies, determining the effect of 
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consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board of 
Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been committed for a 
single term that shall consist of the aggregate of the validly imposed prison 
terms as follows: 
" (a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the maximum 
sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
" (b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if any, 
constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms. 
"(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with 
the other or with a sentence presently being served, the lesser sentence shall 
merge into the greater and the greater shall be the term to be served. If the 
sentences are equal and concurrent, they shall merge into one sentence with the 
most recent conviction constituting the time to be served. 
"(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of 
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of 
any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually served 
under the commitments. 
"(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to 
impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
"(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed to a 
secure correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not 
been terminated or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of where 
the person is located." 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-3-401, UT ST § 76-3-401 
Current through end of 2005 First Special Session 
© 2005 Thomson/West 
END OF DOCUMENT 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
